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Developing military doctrine and military language has been an evolving artsince ancient times.1  New concepts, buzzwords, and acronyms, are always
being invented, but the average shelf life for a term is just short of a year. Occasion-
ally the terms last longer (particularly when they become popular in military socio-
logical and/or military political science circles). The term “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA) is one such term. It conjured up and came to imply an imminent
change in the structure of U.S. military forces, particularly in the Army. A rumor of
backstage conflict in the Pentagon between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and high-ranking Army officials has been occasionally mentioned in newspapers and
on television. This may have some connection with the demise of RMA in favor of
the newest phrase, “America’s New Way of War,” signifying (a more incremental?)





Over the last several years there have been a number of calls for the develop-
ment of a new theoretical doctrine to govern the force structure of the United
States military. The last big change in doctrine occurred in the post-Vietnam
era. It involved not simply the change to the all-volunteer force, but an aban-
donment of escalation brinkmanship and open-ended missions. The subsequent
Powell Doctrine demanded the use of overwhelming force and clear objectives
and boundaries for military intervention. As the new millennium approached,
the deficiencies of the Powell Doctrine became apparent — the multilateral
approach of coalition building and the logistic assembly of forces and equip-
ment was too cumbersome to respond to the new threats from non-state entities.
This led to the development of the concept of Force Transformation as em-
braced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Yet the modernization plans
envisioned by him are meeting significant resistance within the military because
of September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq — in short, such dramatic change is too
risky given these immediate challenges and the entrenched interests of the mili-
tary bureaucracy.
    This paper outlines a number of changes in the overarching social conditions
and the various technological advances in weapons development. Next, the
paper discusses the resistance to change in the military that was demonstrated in
the first Gulf War and the problem of the overextension of the Guards and Re-
serves. Finally, the paper examines a few scenarios of reorganization and three
possible paths that the military can pursue.
Paul R. Camacho is director of special projects at the William Joiner Center at the University
of Massachusetts Boston.
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    Exactly what this new way of war entails has yet to be determined. Certainly one
of the biggest problems is that the potential radical changes are being resisted as a
result of the attacks of September 11 and the deployment in Iraq.3  Any change
would be a move away from the Powell Doctrine that was established during the
first Bush administration. Colin Powell then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was not alone among senior officers who were determined to avoid the quagmire of
a myopically defined conflict. The Powell Doctrine advocated overwhelming force,
coalition building, and a clear exit strategy — all to be developed well before troop
commitments were made. This conceptualization, and in particular its focus on coa-
lition building, found favor with the first President Bush despite its slow, almost
ponderous nature. A second feature of the developing new doctrine was its freedom
from the limitations and boundaries of the Cold War, one consequence of which has
been an increase in the unpredictability and aggressiveness of second-world and
third-world nations, many of which are exploring new-found freedom that came
with the dissolution of fifty years of Cold War traditions and political alignments.
Another has been the rise in Islamic fundamentalism across the Muslim world. One
might argue that these two features were always operating, but they were hidden
beneath the sea of superpower alignments. Another feature impacting our military is
the incredible growth of electronic technology applications. Sectors of the military
such as command and control, logistics, and procurement are finding it challenging
to take advantage of the technologies in a manner that supports managerial control.
Thus, in barely a decade our military has reached a crossroads and finds it must
adjust to the post-industrial world so as to meet the demands of the civilian control
structure in order to secure the new world order, particularly when these demands
require speed and maneuverability.
Social Conditions as an Impetus for Change
The changing nature of socio-structural conditions within and between states and
between nation-states and multinational corporations is providing the impetus for
change in military doctrine and the application of that doctrine. The world landscape
has changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War alli-
ances. The consequence has been labeled a global power vacuum. Perhaps it is better
to say that these events created a number of vacuums in institutional arrangements
across the political, social, and economic landscapes of the world and drastically
changed institutional arrangements within, between, and among nation-states. These
changes are of such magnitude that even the United States cannot adequately fill the
various voids with the needed treasure or commitment. And yet the United States
does not want anyone else to fill these voids, not even the United Nations.4
Globalization and Controlling Oil and the Global Economy
The rise of the global economy as is commonly conceptualized in America today
began with the passage of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Act
in 1947, but is more commonly associated with the latest of the adopted sessions or
“rounds” in 1986–94.5  In author Frank Herbert’s Dune it is the quest to control the
“spice” that drives the economic, political, and military action of the empire.  The
spice enabled those who controlled it to control the world around them — it folded
time, it powered the empire, and so on.6  Here on Earth, that spice is called oil, the
strategic commodity that will govern the direction of world development over the
next hundred years and those who control the oil will control the future
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development of the world. It is crucial for Europe and America, for the security of
oil stocks is of paramount interest to those nations and major corporations.7  Oil is a
strategic factor to the power elite and current U.S. policies reflect this concern.
     Source: World Oil, 223, no. 8 (August 2002)
     http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/table81.htm
World development as a matter of theory and practice remains stubbornly bifur-
cated along a North-South divide.8  From the north looking south, the theoretical
perspective is that of modernization theory with its advocacy sponsorship anchored
in the policies and programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). From the south, the view-
point remains primarily anchored in dependency theory, critical and suspicious of
the international corporations and their IMF, WB, and WTO institutions.9  Global
trade is equated with global corporate domination and the export of far more value
than is invested. It is asymmetrical warfare on the corporate front. Despite the inven-
tive protests of a tiny internationally networked minority, corporate domination is
all but impossible to defend against. Without politics by some other means, the over-
whelming victory of the global corporations is all but announced. If there is any
schism, it is internal to the corporations of the developed nations and their respective
market share of the development and extraction of third-world resources. The recent
and temporary balk of France, Russia, and China over the United States proposed
UN resolution concerning Iraq cannot but be seen as tied to the development of oil
reserves.
Continuum of Conflict
The American way of war is destined to rapidly change in the next decade. To a
significant degree this change is the consequence of (1) advances in basic science
that have been harnessed to technological innovation in connection with the develop-
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ment of new weapons systems, (2) the growth of limited warfare (asymmetrical)
conflicts that are increasingly more probable given the hegemony of American
military power, and (3) the rise of non-state actors representing, or at least claiming
to represent, aggrieved populations.
The focus of the past has been on the Pentagon’s ability to fight two and one half
major wars simultaneously.10  The nature of the war being prepared for has tradition-
ally been conventional war. This seems to have been the case despite the fact that
until recently many of the conflicts for which a military response has been deemed
necessary have been very limited engagements that have fallen far short of anything
close to even a half war. Many writers have discussed the types of conflict in mod-
ern U.S. military thinking. One of these would certainly have to be Admiral Henry
Eccles.11  His typology ranged from blockade to nuclear war and was accompanied
by a notion of a sliding scale of conflict intensity. More recent authors such as Rob-
ert Haass and Richard Connaughton discuss particular types of interventions such as
peacekeeping, nation building, reprisal, and so on. Each of these endeavors has its
own special conceptualization of the problem and recommendations for the type and
limits of the required mission. One can fairly easily envision that each requires a
different force structure and style of response.12
The Growing Influence of NGOs
During the April 2002 Army War College 13th Annual Strategy Conference in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a number of predominantly negative comments were made
about the growing phenomenon of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in-
volved in international conflict.
There are many varieties of NGO. Some are involved with poverty/famine relief
work or healthcare while others are concerned with development, and some prosely-
tize religion.13  It is the significant degree of independence of the NGOs in failed
states/war-zones that is particularly troublesome for the combatants on all sides.
Since they are not under the authoritative military control of any side, their true
nature is suspect. On the other hand, because they are non-military, it is less danger-
ous for civilians in a war zone to interact with them. It is the NGO’s ability to inter-
act more easily with virtually all players that has created a kind of service delivery
market niche; thus agencies of governments often contract with NGOs to establish
and conduct aid programs. As independent entities they are becoming increasingly
important in policy-making within and among nations and at the global level
through the UN.
At present the Bush administration is piqued by what it perceives to be the failure
of the NGOs to sufficiently advocate for or extol the virtues of American democracy
and supply-side economics, and the U.S. Agency for International Development is
attempting to exert more control over its contractors. Accordingly, it is requiring
that “its” NGOs refrain from speaking with media people or pushing for policy
initiatives connected to AIDS or fair trade, and so on. Exactly why the administra-
tion is so adamant about this is puzzling since the contradictions are overwhelmingly
obvious to many third-world people.14  The only logical hypothesis is that all of this
is part of an ideological domestic equation here in the United States.
Outsourcing: The Privatization of the Military?
Military contractors and suppliers have been around almost as long as large-scale
military organizations themselves. Yet, while there are a number of global-sized
corporations involved in the military contractor business, it is during the last few
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decades that some of these contractors have noticeably crossed over into the area of
military operations. One of the most established of these private military companies
or contractors (PMCs) is Kellogg Brown and Root, which, when it was Brown, Root
& Johnson, became the largest contractor in Vietnam and is currently a part of the
Halliburton firm. According to a recent Business Week article, military contractors
are responsible for between 20 percent and 30 percent of military support services.
Yet there is a growing uneasiness about relying so heavily on a PMC, since military
fighting capabilities might be virtually crippled if contractors balked at providing
assistance in combat situations.15  The dependency of the military on such contractors
was underscored by the attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in May 2003. Vinnell Cor-
poration personnel were the specific targets in that bombing because of their con-
tract to train the Saudi Arabian National Guard.16
There are two broad and overarching concerns here. One involves the question of
loyalty: What control does the client state have over the performance and actions of
the PMCs under contract, particularly when failure to perform could result in a
serious international incident if not possibly a battlefield defeat? A second concern
involves the degree to which these PMCs can develop to the point where they could
challenge legitimate third-world governments,17  or be willing to negotiate and even
exploit their corporate networks to initiate conflicts that further a corporate agenda.
Does the well-financed corporate image really differentiate them from mercenaries?
Space Corps
Space will be very important in the not so distant future.18  We are already familiar
with satellites as essential for communication, identification, and targeting. Satellites
and thus space are important for viewing the total battlefield, for extending the the-
ater commander’s vision beyond the current event horizon. In space as on the
ground, bureaucratic career stakes are operating to advance or hinder organizational
change.19  The fact of stakeholders is an important issue in the military as well as in
the large corporation. New systems tend to get “stove piped”20  into existing struc-
tures. This leads to organizational labyrinths and calls for reorganization, stream-
lining, and so on. But inertia is the rule for individual stakeholders as well as the
organizational culture. Thus while incremental change and new weapon systems are
supported, resistance hardens when nurtured programs develop a rationale that chal-
lenges the current culture.
In a recent paper submitted to Armed Forces and Society, the author noted a
number of bureaucratic difficulties faced by those trying to transition to a “Space
and Air Force.”21  It concerned the rhetoric of long-range policy articulated by the
Air Force leadership in 1996–97 to emphasize the critical role of space in the first
Gulf War and all future wars.22  But moving beyond rhetoric is much more of a fight
“on the ground” within the military bureaucracy. On one hand, high-ranking Air
Force generals do not want to see space separated from the province of the Air Force
command, but they refuse to give it the central role it deserves.23
One of the important aspects for the success of change is the presence of influen-
tial sponsors. Without bureaucratic sponsorship, potential programs often never get
an opportunity to develop, or to develop free from interference from those
sponsoring other programs or by agencies that view the new programs as challenges
for funding. Simply put, the idea of a space force transition in terms of structure,
missions, capabilities, and applications has been too much of a paradigm shift for
the Air Force bureaucracy and culture — another vector for career paths, budgets,
policy, and programs, that by their very nature will eventually tend to grow out of
New England Journal of Public Policy
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their purview. Thus, the bureaucracy with a stake in the status quo resists change by
thwarting any development of supporting doctrine beyond the air power theory;
space technology is seen as a resource to be integrated into the current organization,
not a force for some new doctrine that provides space technology a more powerful
location in air power theory. The contradiction of support and resistance within the
same organization is an element of the bureaucratic condition.
The militarization of space is another area of concern. The “star-wars” debates of
the 1980s and the 1990s raised concerns that are still viable.  Early warning, surveil-
lance, navigation, and communications satellites are obviously a standard feature of
America’s technological arsenal but, as the Center for Defense Information reported
in the mid 1970s, the concept of “killer satellites” was also on the drawing board for
both the United States and the Soviets.24   How much this specific technology has
advanced since the end of the Cold War is unknown. The basic research and devel-
opment and prototype development costs of such technology are no doubt prohibi-
tive for virtually all nations outside the first world. With potential competition
muted, certainly for the foreseeable future, the United States has possibly lowered
the position of space-related projects on the defense agenda.
Non-Lethal Weapons
One of the most recent developments revolves around the concept, development, and
production of what has been euphemistically referred to as non-lethal weapons.
Non-lethal weapons are those weapons, which, when deployed, account for a mor-
tality rate of less than 25 percent among those impacted.25  The range and scope of
these weapons varies markedly. Some of the technologies are relatively familiar
though they might qualify as weapons of mass destruction since they involve gas.
One set of these agents is referred to as calmative agents. The Russian response
against Chechen terrorists at a Moscow theater represents a disastrous misapplication
of this type of technology. Others of the same ilk may assault other sensory organs.
Infrasound technologies, for example, induce a physical imbalance leading to imme-
diate, if not lethal, bodily illness (general physical orientation impairment, vomit-
ing, and so on.), while other techniques being advanced produce similar effects by
assaulting the individuals’ vision. These technologies, if developed and put into
production, have significant potential domestic uses such as crowd or demonstration
control.26
Other technologies involve the use of polymers or caustic materials to disable
major weapon systems in unique ways — by cutting off oxygen from combustion
engines, by reducing the friction of moving parts and/or traction capability. The
delivery mechanism for most of these items is the artillery shell or rocket. Finally,
there are also a number of control agents at the storybook stage, which involve bio-
technologies — bacteria or enzymes that eat, destroy, or otherwise modify fuel or
change the intoxicant/euphoric properties of illegal drugs. One of the most acces-
sible volumes on this matter is Morehouse’s.27
One sensitive question about the new non-lethal technologies is whether they will
spill over to civilian use by agencies that come under the Department of Justice.
Such technology might lead toward a degree of social control that has never existed
before. Obviously, the implications that this intrusive technology may have for our
society are immense.
Information War
Another military idea of the last decade is the notion of cyberwar or information
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war, and the term cyberwar typically includes the concept of viruses destroying
enemy computer systems. More advanced generations of software-probing weapons
may be able to penetrate financial systems and create, modify, or destroy specific
accounts. Security for and domination over the Internet in general is rapidly
becoming a priority for defense institutions. The difficulty is that control over such
technology does not make for an easy fit into the warrior mold. High-technology
weaponry and advanced real-time intelligence communications are an immediate
priority.  These systems are for the most part new devices for the warriors to employ
or communication technologies that are essential for the warrior on the modern
battlefield. But the warrior is still thought of as one employing some type of
destructive hardware that inflicts physical damage to a target. Certainly computer
 experts armed with the appropriate software and hardware would be inflicting dam-
age and are going to become essential cyberwarriors of the future, but the image is
less testosterone-filled than the military’s self-perception currently involves.
The term “information war” is becoming more comon than “cyberwar.” It con-
tains both the immediately aggressive application of power to enemy technology,
that is, cyberwar, but also concerns the public relations and opinion development of
any major corporate marketing campaign. The importance of a persuasive message
is becoming more fundamental to the conduct of military operations. The develop-
ment and presentation of this message is falling toward web-based information sys-
tems and sites. Marketing the message is becoming increasingly more important for
military operations. Some researchers argue that public relations services manage the
flow of information and are key institutions in contemporary militaries.
The Defense Departments website, http://www.DefendAmerica.mil, serves as an
example of this. It is a carefully developed document presenting the administration’s
position — a virtual newspaper dedicated to legitimizing and detailing the present
course of action.  The public relations approach to war has been recently discussed
by a number of commentators. One film critic discussed the recent 2003 war in Iraq
— and any future wars — as Hollywood productions, beautifully shot and marketed
as “rock-the-casbah patriotism” and credits the effort to imitate Hollywood to the
Reagan administration,28  the realization of the “power elite” described by Mills a
half-century ago.29
The principal point of the writers who discuss media spin and information is that
the important war is the war to control domestic and international public opinion. In
that world web pages are to become increasingly important. They advance particular
geopolitical views in the highly contested territory in cyberspace.  This cyberbattle
space involves control over the communication opportunities, the development of
cyberwar doctrine — a structure for strategies and tactics for cyberspace control,
and the utilization of such websites by the Department of Defense (and by their
counterparts in the various ministries of defense in Europe, and the like) — as a
strategic Internet tool.30   What does it mean, and what is the significance of the fact
that the Internet has made once sensitive military information more available? Is the
information no longer sensitive? Is it less valuable, or does it mean that the military
establishment and the Defense Department have to re-conceptualize their communi-
cation with the state and the public, as well as with other states and their publics?
One set of metrics to measure websites may be ease of access, breadth of access, and
quantity and quality of information.31
The Weapons Cascade
Another factor forcing change in the conduct of warfare is growth in the dispersion
New England Journal of Public Policy
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of weapons systems. U.S policy has publicly focused on weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) and linked this concern with the growth of terrorism. The fear is that
terrorist networks will gain access to these weapon systems and not hesitate to em-
ploy them. Glaringly absent from the public media is comment about the original
corporate sources of production and dissemination of WMD technology. Critiques of
the defense business have been a serious research subject since Dwight Eisenhower
warned the American public about the military defense complex. Barnett wrote
about the industrial power of the Pentagon and the defense/corporate industry in the
1970s.32  Gordon Adams has referred to this nexus of defense contracting as the “iron
triangle.”33   More recently, Randall Forsberg has referred to the process of weapons
diffusion as the cascade of weapons technology.34  Her study, which was particularly
focused on the dissemination of high-technology fighter aircraft, points to the con-
tradiction in policy among many western countries, particularly the United States:
on one hand there is a declaration of public policy toward limiting the spread of
weapons systems around the globe, while on the other hand the United States is the
leading exporter of weapons systems.35
Yet the production of and consequent cascade of weapons and weapons technol-
ogy is not limited to high-technology fighter aircraft. First-world and second-world
nation-states sell weapons to second-world and third-world nation-states, from there
the weapons are easily disseminated to non-governmental organizations, networks of
organized crime cartels such as the narco-mafia organizations, and religious entities
such as Al Qaeda and Hamas.
Examination of the origins of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction
points back to the West and to “dual-use” technology. Certainly some of these sys-
tems and stocks of WMD material came directly from the West, and some portion of
that directly from the United States during the time that Iraq with its leader Saddam
Hussein was our major ally in the region before and after the war between Iran and
Iraq.
Asymmetrical Warfare
Asymmetrical warfare refers to difference, and the use of this difference, to gain an
advantage over the opposition. The notion of asymmetry becomes most apparent in
the contrast of conflict between very dissimilar cultures with different levels of
economic, social, and political structure. This phenomenon was used in one social
science study as the basis for a “Good War — Bad War” typology construct.36  To-
day, this difference is referred to as asymmetry.
One of the most direct discussions concerning the development of asymmetry in
warfare can be found in the work of Metz and Johnson.37  They have developed a
conceptualization of several dimensions of temporality, internationality, state of risk,
level of integration, style of organization, and several psychological dispositions.
They also support the notions of consequences initially identified by Leventman
in that the more heterogeneous or asymmetrical the conflict, the greater the possi-
bilities for incongruous responses to each other’s actions.38  Metz and Johnson point
out further that if one of the contending societies is much more heterogeneous that
the other, the asymmetrical strategy for the more homogenous society is to leverage
the advantage that avails itself at the seams of the enemy’s social structure — to
attack at the racial, ethnic, cultural weak points. They note that the United States is
such a complex society; that the complexity creates seams in the social, political, or
economic sectors that constitute targeting opportunities. Since our society is increas-
ingly diverse and interconnected, there are seams to be exploited. The authors offer
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a five-point conceptual response for our current military leaders to note in both
offensive and defensive terms: organizational flexibility, focused intelligence, mini-
mal vulnerability, full dimensional precision, and integrated homeland security.
In summary, positive asymmetry refers to the advantages one has over the enemy
while negative asymmetry refers to one’s weaknesses, the advantages the enemy has
over you.39  Terrorism can be thought of as asymmetrical warfare, and, in fact, has
been listed along with information warfare and weapons of mass destruction as
forms of asymmetrical warfare since 1995. The most glaring form of positive asym-
metry is the technical resource advantage of the United States over everyone else.
The most current glaring form of negative asymmetry is the tactical response of the
Palestinians to Israeli occupation in the West Bank — suicide bombings.
Bureaucratic Conflict:
Change and Resistance to Change
One of the most common themes in bureaucratic studies is the notion of conflict and
it can be a result of internal or external forces or a combination. Change and resis-
tance to change have been a theme in virtually all studies of the military bureau-
cracy.  Ackley40  focused on the tendency for structure, size, and procedural inertia in
the face of forces of change
As both the theoretical and practical case-level literature on social change makes
abundantly clear, much of this change is manifested in the area of technology. In
general, the rate and level of adaptation to change is higher in the area of products
than in that of social organization or in areas of normative behavior.41  But changes
in technology tend to be cumulative and eventually they are of a degree of magni-
tude that impacts the organizational or even social structure. Change in both infor-
mation and weapons technology has reached a threshold where there is an impetus
for organizational change. In military affairs jargon this has come to be referred to
as RMA — revolution in military affairs.42
Gulf War I Internal Conflict in the Air Force
One of the most interesting accounts of bureaucratic infighting is in the work of
Mandeles. This account of the official Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) was
commissioned by the Air Force in August 1991 after the first Gulf War. It is quite
focused on internal details, and thick with military acronyms. The account raises
interesting questions about the capabilities of knowledge management in the mili-
tary. Its overarching theme is the complexity of the relationships within and between
organizations in connection with the management of complex weapon systems com-
mitments and missions. The notion of a play with front- and backstage action is
useful here. At frontstage is the discussion of organization and development of the
command and control structure of three inter-related sectors of the air war: the air
tasking order (ATO), the guidance, apportionment, and targeting procedures (GAT),
and the bomb damage assessment analysis (BDA). The backstage action involved
matters of careerism and bureaucratic competition among high-level commanders
who operate just below the threshold of public media interest.
The backstage maneuvering constituted a “turf war” with organizations and their
personnel jostling for position. The social conditions that engendered this were the
inertia and ponderous nature of the Air Force bureaucracy. The internal argument of
one set of players was that U.S. Air Force Central Command (CENTAF) could not
develop an organizational plan quickly enough and that any delay in planning would
New England Journal of Public Policy
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potentially engender political conflict among the coalition forces. These two issues
created a rationale for those military commanders favoring Air Power Doctrine
theory over Air-Land Battle Doctrine and led to the establishment of a secret plan-
ning group called “Black Hole.” On one side were those members of the traditional
CENTAF planning groups who were comfortable with their established procedures,
and on the other side there were those coalescing under the Black Hole group. The
agents for change had the edge in élan and far fewer communication channel restric-
tions.
The point was that the Black Hole group insisted that reorganization was required
not only to strengthen and standardize operations, but also to enable commanders in
the theater to get operational control of their assigned assets that were held by com-
manders outside the Gulf Theater. Eventually the Black Hole group was incorpo-
rated under CENTAF, but the Air Power Doctrine people had won the day and es-
sentially came to dominate developments inside the tactical air control center
(TACC), and controlled the planning and development of the master attack plan
(MAP).43
The student of the Mandeles text 44 comes to realize that he is studying a factor in
the revolution in military affairs — the ever-burgeoning level of military technol-
ogy has created very serious organizational challenges in terms of managing knowl-
edge and technology with regard to the development and implementation of
command and control structure. Three specific new problems are (1) wide-open
communications, (2) dangerous technological imbalance within and among necessar-
ily related organizational substructures, and (3) inadequate training exercises for the
operations personnel in the “back room” are revealed in the authors’ discussion
about the ATO, GAT and BDA. Serious inefficiencies in processing the massive
volume of missions and issuing the appropriate air tasking orders (ATO), dissemi-
nating the accompanying GAT information (what kinds of ordnance to use for each
particular target, and so forth), and compiling accurate post-mission damage assess-
ments (BDA).
• First, the new technology had an incredible volume of open commu-
nications that any planning group could acquire from unofficial
channels. This means that the command structure is increasingly
porous and increasingly influenced by bureaucratic sectors outside of
the immediate theater-level structure.45
• Second, the authors identified a seriously mismatched technology,
particularly in bomb damage assessment: there was no LAN network
in the BDA shop; they were using entirely incompatible operating
systems and/or software programs. Data about BDA had to be
translated to ASCII text and hand-loaded by floppy disk into the
other machine.46  The huge volume of missions and sorties and the
incredible volume of data (such as digitized satellite phone data,
calls, handwritten reports, and the like) overwhelmed these shops.
•  Third, this study revealed the need to refocus some training exercises
for which the focus in the past had been on the delivery of the air
package. The execution of the ATO, the design of the GAT, and the
assessments about BDA had been taken as given in the training
environment. It has been assumed that these three critical processes
would always run smoothly. Yet in the Gulf, there was no standard-
ization of input into the BDA. Information came from everywhere
with little quality control.
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The first Gulf War illustrated how assumptions about the past can constitute a
dangerous precedent, a kind of Catch 22 here. The U.S. military had more resources
than it could manage but felt the need to reuse them because we were uncertain
about the results of our first use of them. The more the resources were used, and the
more that data was asked for about the efficiency of their use, the more the military
analysts were overwhelmed, and the more errors cascaded down the procedural
chain of command. Thus one can argue somewhat ironically that this need for rapid
and fluid data “from everywhere” also carries with it a need for formal procedures
to complement and contain it. To employ the computer programming metaphor, the
focus of the past has been on “hierarchical” and “procedure-driven” organizational
structure, when perhaps the military should be moving in the direction of a more
“object-driven” organizational structure. What is really raised here is the question of
knowledge management, and this has to be addressed throughout the Armed Ser-
vices.
The Overextension of the Guards and Reserves
The turmoil of the Vietnam decade created an atmosphere where once again (as with
the Civil War) the draft was the subject of great debate. It was the failure of Vietnam
and the intertwining relationship of the draft with racial discrimination and “chan-
neling,” as was the outcome of such 1960s draft efforts as Project 100,000 that di-
rected 100,000 minorities per year to the infantry, that created the support to repeal
the draft and move to an all-volunteer Army in 1973.47  The changing trends were,
of course, of sociological interest to many military researchers such as Moskos and
Segal, as well as to entities such as the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society.48
Prior to the voluntary Army, the Reserves were not used or given much attention
by the Department of Defense (DoD). They were far down on the equipment and
training list. It was the change to the volunteer Army in 1973 and a reworking of the
Force Structure in the mid 1980s that dramatically changed the service commitment
for the Reserve and National Guard, as the structure shifted from mass force to swift
mobilization.49  This meant a smaller active duty component — one that would have
to be relied on, or supplemented by, a Reserve/Guard component. Consequently,
training and equipment for the Guard and Reserve was dramatically improved and
they began to be more actively deployed.
The conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq have all required extensive
call-ups. Currently, Reserves and particularly Guards are the “main force” in Bosnia
and Kosovo. According to Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), 136,000 Reserve
and Guard troops have been activated, representing a sizable proportion of the
troops strength in U.S. military deployments worldwide, including Afghanistan and
Iraq and this will be the case for the next several years.50  This extensive level of
call-up has begun to take its toll on both public and private sector employers. In the
public sector some 10–14 percent of police and fire forces in local governments
across the country have been activated.  This has led to staffing problems, which in
turn has meant more overtime pay and the consequent budget dilemmas for these
local entities.
At some point, this overextension of the Guards and Reservists will have to be
addressed by those seeking to reorganize the nature of U.S. warfare. The American
brand of Blitzkreig works extremely well in terms of disabling traditional military
organized resistance, but the follow-through has to be completely reorganized. The
inability to contain unrest and restore law and order has undermined the
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administration’s credibility. That is to say, if one believed the administration’s
claims, or went along with them quiescently, assuming that the war would be short
and contained, then that willingness and quasi-support ebbed quickly in the three
months following the President’s declaration of victory. Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld’s plans for reorganization, such as they were, are now in tatters. The Iraqi
resistance illustrates that the danger of the small, quick, and mobile force structure is
its lack of depth and breadth to carry out the broader nonwarfare functions. The
United States simply does not have the numbers of troops available or trained to do
the extensive and critical occupation work. Guards and Reservists have been ex-
tended to the point where enlistment and retention is in serious jeopardy — and it
appears that there may be even more call-ups in the near future.51  The lightning-
maneuver doctrine of the high-technology military that Rumsfeld wants has two
linchpins: a strong, well-trained Reservist and Guard component with a “plug and
play” — “off the shelf” — capability that can deploy virtually instantly and second,
an occupational-nation-building capability that it currently does not have, nor can it
engineer the use of proxy troops to do it for the United States. The point is that
overextension of Guards and Reservists will eventually decimate those units when
family and civilian career commitments demand priority. The consequence is that
the doctrine of small and light, rapid and technologically sophisticated force de-
ployed under a theoretical strategy of maneuver becomes too risky or useless to
execute — because the follow-though to secure the peace/nation-building is nonex-
istent.52
Reorganization: Doctrinal Change and
the New Way of War
Warfare and, more particularly, the theory of warfare have undergone many changes
over the last few hundred years. The pace or tempo of war has increased with tech-
nological advance in general. In an anthology concerning future warfare, Major
General Robert H. Scales argues that the nature and speed of warmaking has fol-
lowed a reciprocal pattern of capability, one cycle favoring offensive war followed
by another favoring defensive war — action and counter-action in styles of military
dominance.53  Thus there is a kind of pendulum effect between a focus on firepower
and attrition (generally defense) and on speed and maneuver (generally offense).
The tactical advantage of firepower is found in its paralytic impact on the enemy;
that of speed and maneuver is control of the battlefield so as to increase one’s oppor-
tunities and to limit those of the enemy. Yet, though firepower and maneuver are
crucial for military operations in the field, they are not substitutes for understanding
the nature of political, social, and economic changes that determine military action
in the first place.
One of the interesting viewpoints about the end of the Cold War is that the world
may be simultaneously both more secure and more dangerous than during it. Our
society is more secure in that nuclear brinkmanship such as the Cuban missile crisis
is not a readily plausible scenario, and more vulnerable to danger in that the once
aligned nation-states on each side are much more unpredictable in their foreign
policy activities than before. Indeed, we can argue that many of our allies have
“jumped the reservation” of U.S.-determined foreign policy and are embarking on
paths that could destabilize entire regions, engage in relations with anti-American
non-state actors, and so forth. The recent actions of France and Germany at the UN
in the months before the American invasion are a case in point. More recently, the
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U.S. candidate for election to the Organization of American States Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in Latin America was rejected. This represents the
first time in four decades that the U.S. has had no representation.54
The overarching theme in any discussion about the new American military and its
way of war revolves around reorganization capable of adjusting and responding to
the challenges at the opening of the new millennium. For many military theorists
and practitioners this means organizational change in all branches of service. The
service facing the greatest challenge is the Army because only the Army can guaran-
tee definitive results in anything greater than island-seizing. Occupation of signifi-
cant territory is beyond the capability, and is not even in the mandate of, any other
branch of service. As we now see in Iraq, definitive results require controlling siz-
able territory for a significant length of time. Yet the current force structure in the
Army is designed for a Cold War-style massive land confrontation that is no longer
a likelihood of military conflict. Symmetrical warfare is history.
Macgregor makes an analogy between the Greeks and Romans in 200 BC.55  The
Romans were able to overcome the previously invincible Macedonian phalanx by
using smaller and more mobile Legions with principles of organization and
strategies of confrontation that were adaptable. His point is that currently the United
States Army is like the Macedonian phalanx and that it needs to become the flexible
Legion if it is to successfully address the problems it will have to confront in the
new styles of warfare in the new millennium. Obviously, any planning for reorgani-
zation must be linked to concepts or visions about the character of future war. The
problem is that thinking gets blurred because there is a tendency to focus on
weapons systems as the element of change — (1) because it’s obvious that the arms
industry is constantly working on weapons systems and (2) because people become
enamored with the technology of firepower. This is a potentially dangerous set of
errors because weapon systems are not a substitute for innovative organizational
structure, solid strategy, or even tactical planning.
He argues that the Army’s standard ten-division structure is too large, complex,
and centralized, which results in a slow deployment and potential vulnerability from
even guerrilla-grade WMD technology. For Macgregor, even the brigade organiza-
tion suffers deficiencies in command and control. His remedy calls for the breakup
of the Cold War division force structure into twenty-five to thirty “plug and play”
combat groups under a unified joint command.56  All of this discussion and argument
for reorganization butts against the prevailing social conditions of inertia in the
military corporate structure. Again, not just individual careers, but career paths are
at stake.
This is the problem Rumsfeld is currently facing. The situation in Iraq has
imperiled his theoretical doctrine of maneuver warfare with rapid, mobile,
technologically superior troops as the way of the future. It appears that guerrilla war
will have another opportunity to exhaust the conventional forces and the patience of
the civilian society at home. All this may serve as a serious caveat to those enamored
by technology and lightning maneuver. This possibility also illuminates another
requirement for the new way of war: the ability to deploy “troops” capable of
winning the peace. Currently “winning the peace” is a slippery concept, but for this
administration in the grip of numerous imperial-minded Republican political
theorists, it apparently means reconstructing societies in the American image, or at
the very least reorganizing entire societies until they are willing to pay cultural
homage and accept the current lopsided agreements concerning free trade as
espoused by the global corporations: no other arrangement seems acceptable to the
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current administration. Yet, even advocating or accepting this as a national policy to
pursue globally, the U.S. has no nation-building “divisions.” The natural entity for
this is the UN, but U.S. policy is decidedly determined to be thoroughly
independent of the UN. It is apparent from the remarks of President Bush that the
current U.S. policy is to demand the UN subject itself to the designs of U.S. global
policy — not the other way around. This is not likely to happen, or at least not
happen without tremendous resentment and dubious commitment. This leaves us
with the alternative of creating our own “nation-building force” that is, expanding
the concept and size of civil affairs units, construction battalions, and the like, or
contracting it out to ideologically loyal NGOs or profit-oriented corporate entities.
It remains to be seen whether these alternatives can succeed, but they are the only
alternatives to creating our own nation-building forces.
Conclusion: Paths to Change
The situation in Iraq has created a special opportunity for the United States military
to engage in a serious re-examination of its most fundamental concepts and doc-
trines. The changing nature of the socio-political and economic nature of the world
requires those who advocate American world hegemony to develop new warfare
doctrines and grand strategies, which currently favor rapid deployment, joint-force
participation, and a seamless structure and process of command and control capabil-
ity. Yet there is great resistance to such change within the military, in part because
stakeholders in power zealously guard the maintenance of the present structure and
in part because the future seems to contain a fog thicker than the fog of war on the
present-day battlefield. The difficulty to be surmounted here is that the battlefield
can no longer be though of as a landscape of conflict, but rather as the profile of
conflict that rests on a socio-political-economic landscape. The end of the Cold War
has created a more independent third world, the global economy has begun to en-
counter more resistance from the third world, and the rise of non-state actors has
developed as a response to American dominance. Much of this concept has been
incorporated into the current political sound bite, that is, “we won the war, but are
in danger of losing the peace.” — because “war” is slipping over into other arenas of
social life.57
There are a number of reasons for this, both political and military. One of the
political reasons involves the hubris of the current administration, which has handled
its foreign policy very poorly and is locked into an extremely unilateral position
engendered by a few imperial-minded think tanks. The military bureaucracy is
locked into the possibility of losing the peace principally because it resists changing
to incorporate the less-than-war-fighting functionalities it needs to do the nation-
building job and cannot seamlessly transition command to those who could accom-
plish these functions, even if those resources were in place (which is definitely not
the case). Significant analysis concerning the reconstruction of Iraq has been per-
formed by entities such as the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and some parts of
their four-stage formula seem to have been implemented, but this author doubts that
it will be completed. There will be too much political resistance from sectors of the
administration and the military to actually gradually relinquish control and/or to
insist on micromanaging affairs after they ostensibly do relinquish control.58  All
those willing to provide assistance will be alienated and isolated if they balk at the
predefined administration storyboard.
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Remain the Same . . . for Now
The Rumsfeld Doctrine is filled with unrealized promise of flexibility of execu-
tion and application of forces appropriate to any situation — the principal endeavor
of “Force Transformation.” The first part of the equation, flexibility and execution,
is now a proven capability, but the second part of the equation, the application of
appropriate forces (in the postwar fighting phase) requires considerable work if the
Rumsfeld Doctrine is to be successful. The problem lies within the military culture,
which, like many large corporate organizations, suffers from two bureaucratic mala-
dies, trained incapacity and professional deformation. The first is the old Thorston
Veblen observation that bureaucracies set firmly in their organizational structures
tend to recognize all new problems as old problems requiring the standard means of
treatment. New features are treated as unwanted information and simply sheared
from the intelligence reports. Janis addressed this as a condition of “groupthink” in a
work of the same name.59  Professional deformation is a condition described by Rob-
ert Warnott as a situation where the means become ends in themselves and are pre-
served as sacrosanct rituals or entities in the traditionally anchored organization. A
presentation of both these conditions can be found in Merton’s discussion of refer-
ence groups.60  Hence, the countervailing forces resist the change they desperately
need to make, and thus the nation is at a junction in its military structure. Some
writers argue that September 11th and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have pre-
empted Secretary Rumsfeld’s plans to implement “Force Transformation” that in his
opinion is a radical but necessary reconfiguration of the U.S. military.61
Incorporating New Capabilities within
the Established Structure
This path represents an incremental approach that may or may not achieve the ulti-
mate goal — a new military and way of war that is “total” in that the United States
achieves its goal of reconstructing those societies and nations identified by the cur-
rent administration as requiring such intervention. As mentioned above, this would
require that the military (1) create a solid and very extensive nation-building capa-
bility or (2) establish far better relations among the international NGO groups and
the United Nations or (3) establishing our own ideologically loyal NGO configura-
tions and/or contract nation-building functions out to private sector corporations.
Another alternative is to reincorporate some old capabilities with a renewed commit-
ment. Specifically, if the U.S. military mission is now going to encompass nation-
building and it would rather keep control of the implementation of such an
endeavor, then it has to possess the capability to carry out essential infrastructure
construction and institution building. This would involve no small commitment. The
situation in Iraq could easily accommodate a division of a modern-day version of
the old Navy Seabees (Construction Battalions). If NGOs and other volunteer groups
and contractor corporations are unable or unwilling to participate because of security
concerns, then what other choice is there for an administration that refuses to allow
the UN a major and independent role there?
Yet there are other factors that are currently on the back burner, such as the incor-
poration of space-based technologies. Eventually, the advance of technology will
pass a kind of event horizon that cannot be contained, much less controlled, under
the traditional force structure arrangement, even in the face of maximum joint op-
erations cooperation. This will probably leave the United States extremely vulner-
able to very mobile and lighter opponents. If the tide of war has shifted to the
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offense as Scales has indicated, then the rise of small nation-state or state-like actors
with considerable resources-to-overhead ratio are a viable threat to consider.62  The
United States could end up thrashing at real terrorist/guerrilla threats or at surreal
political-media generated enemies. The end result is a military that can inflict con-
siderable damage, but with little real impact on the enemy. It is the path that encum-
bers the least internal resistance, but is fraught with the danger of being woefully
inadequate should non-state entities, such as Al Qaeda, achieve the capability to
design and implement strategies and execute tactics beneath our technological scope
and/or perhaps equal to them, or achieve technological breakthroughs of their own
that enable them to inflict serious first-strike damage to our offensive and defensive
weapons systems.
Pulling the Commit Switch: A New Military
The development of a thoroughly new Armed Services is a virtually impossible task
because it would require the complete cooperation of the entire military bureaucracy
and its related defense contracting corporate linkages. Under this model the present
structure of all branches of service would have to divest themselves of various func-
tions and capabilities. The rearrangement would require a leap of faith and alle-
giance to a type of diversified and specialized set of self-contained battle and civil
affairs groups under a joint command rubric that would be capable of developing
and employing a variety of “plug and play” configurations for specific types of
interventions. If one entertains just the overviews presented by Haass, Connaughton,
Macgregor, and so forth.63  it is readily apparent that the task requires an overwhelm-
ing commitment on the part of the Armed Services to divest themselves of estab-
lished traditions and career stakes; accept new, independent, and equal military force
structures such as space corps, civilian affairs corps, special operations corps, and
the like, as well as the participation of other non–war-fighting “civil affairs/nation-
building organizational entities (also as equals); and concede control to a similarly
expanded “joint” structure of decisionmakers and operations planners. Established
military planning entities such as the Strategic Studies Institute indicate that the
theoretical “ideal vision” of an authoritative handoff from the military to the U.S.
civilian entities in Iraq is unrealistic. If that is the case, then how much less realistic
is a vision of such a complete military reorganization effort such as “Force Trans-
formation”?64
The U.S. military is coming to a point of decision. It has perhaps a few years
during which to consider all the reconfiguration possibilities. If it is to embrace
nation-building as a critical component of post-intervention war fighting, then it
cannot avoid developing the capabilities to do so and incorporating them into the
military force structure. The handoff from war fighting to social/economic restruc-
turing would take place in-house. From there, the eventual establishment of the
pro-United States indigenous government would take place. This leaves the adminis-
tration relatively free from international encumbrances, that is, the UN with its own
conception of a new world order. This path has the inevitable consequence of further
isolating the United States from the international community, but that is apparently
of little concern to the present administration and the institutions providing it with
unilateral policy positions. z
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